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Advances in neurotechnology will raise new ethical dilemmas, to which scientists and the rest of society
must respond. Here I present a ‘‘toolbox’’ of concepts to help us analyze these issues and communicate
with each other about them across differences of ethical intuition.It is a truism that science is a double-
edged sword. 20th century atomic physics
revolutionized our understanding of
material world and gave us new forms of
energy but also created the deadliest
weapons of all time, which continue to
threaten civilization. The 21st century’s
most transformative science may well
be neuroscience. We are living in a time
of rapid progress, as neuroscientists
gain new insights into the basic science
of brain function and leverage them with
a range of technologies from nanomateri-
als to machine learning. The articles in
this issue of Neuron show the promise
held by many of these methods for
advancing basic science and treating
neurological and psychiatric illness.
In the midst of this rapid progress, how
can we encourage the development of
ethical technologies and applications?
Of course we will not have complete
control over the field’s development, and
we will not even all agree on what con-
stitutes an ethical use. Here I suggest
that a constructive first step is to stock
our ethics ‘‘toolbox.’’ These tools will
help us recognize ethical issues, analyze
them, and communicate with each other
about them.
Two Kinds of Tools:
Consequentialist and Deontological
The ethics toolbox presented here has
two main compartments, for consequen-
tialist and deontological tools. Conse-
quentialism is the ethical framework
most closely associated with philoso-
phers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart
Mill, according to which an act can be
judged right or wrong depending on the
expected value of its outcomes. Talk
of ‘‘risk-benefit ratios,’’ common in IRB
(Internal Review Board) applications, is a
use of consequentialist ethical reasoning.34 Neuron 86, April 8, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier InThis weighing of expected value is such
a natural and obvious way of approaching
ethical decisions in science and technol-
ogy that it may seem pedantic to give it
an ‘‘ism’’ name and cite its 19th century
roots. Indeed, I recall a bioethics meeting
at which a Nobel laureate scientist
impatiently asked, ‘‘What’s all this talk
about? Just assess the benefits to
patients against the risks and costs,
and you’ll know the right thing to do.’’
But as this brilliant scientist came to
appreciate, consequentialism alone does
not fully accord with our ethical intuitions.
For example, we would not be okay
with sacrificing a healthy person to pro-
vide five lifesaving organ transplants,
even though it seems right based on a
simple calculation of aggregate benefits
and costs.
The other widely used approach, which
captures our sense of the wrongness of
using a human being as an involuntary
organ donor, is deontology, often associ-
ated with the 18th philosopher Immanuel
Kant. The name ‘‘deontology’’ comes
from the Greek word for ‘‘duty,’’ and the
approach determines what is ethical in
relation to a set of moral principles that
specify our duties and rights as persons.
Our IRBs apply such principles as well
as risk-benefit calculations. For example,
even if risks are negligible and benefits
are substantial, it would be a violation
of a subject’s right to autonomy to be
enrolled as a research subject without
informed consent.
Philosophers have attempted to recon-
cile the two approaches, for example, by
considering the beneficial consequences
of recognizing rights. This has never
worked satisfactorily and so we are
left with fundamentally different ethical
systems. For many dilemmas the same
decision is recommended regardless ofc.which ethical system we use, but conflict
can arise. Indeed, there are even cases
in which different deontological principles
conflict with one another or different
ways of weighing consequences lead to
different conclusions.
What this means for the toolbox
offered here is that it cannot be applied
algorithmically to reach a determinate
answer. What it can do is capture and
highlight morally relevant considerations
in a given situation, to make more
explicit the grounds for various ethical
positions and to facilitate discussion
when disagreement occurs.
The Deontology Compartment:
Principles for Ethical Decision
Making
Personhood. We all share an intuition
that certain entities, including ourselves,
are persons and hence have rights and
duties, whereas others, including our
furniture, are not and do not. These rights
and duties are spelled out in the principles
of deontological ethics. Many issues in
bioethics have been analyzed in terms
of personhood rights. For example, if a
fetus is a person, then it has a right to
life and abortion is wrong.
What is a person? For Kant personhood
was related to the cognitive wherewithal
(or cognitive potential, for the immature)
to think and act morally. Others have
used broader criteria, such as rationality
and self-consciousness, but bioethics
still lacks explicit criteria that capture our
intuitions about who or what is a person
without being circular (Farah and Heber-
lein, 2007).
Dignity. This concept was introduced
into ethics by Kant as part of his explana-
tion of how persons differ from objects.
In Kant’s terms, objects have prices,
such that one thing can be fairly replaced
by another when the prices are equal. This
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entertain a trade for friends or family
members regardless of the outstanding
objective traits the proposed replacement
has. Persons have what Kant called a
‘‘worth beyond value,’’ which he termed
dignity. Recently, this term has been
used in a related sense by socially conser-
vative bioethicists (Pellegrino et al., 2009)
to encompass a kind of deep appreciation
of humanity in all its imperfection and has
thus figured in arguments against neuro-
technological enhancement of humans.
Commodification. This concept refers
to the extension of market value to
parts of persons and their capabilities,
including organs, reproductive capabil-
ities, and cognitive capabilities.
Rights. These are moral entitlements,
‘‘must-haves’’ rather than ‘‘nice-to-haves’’;
in the words of the U.S. Declaration of
Independence, ‘‘inalienable’’ from per-
sons. An example is the right to privacy.
Beauchamp and Childress Principles
of Bioethics. Bioethicists Thomas Beau-
champ and James Childress crafted a
set of specific principles to guide biomed-
ical research and practice (Beauchamp
and Childress, 2012). They are: Respect
for Autonomy, which emphasizes the right
to control our own lives, Beneficence,
which refers to the duty to help others,
Nonmalfesience, the duty to ‘‘do no
harm,’’ and Justice, which concerns
broader duties to society, for example,
promoting fairness and following the law.
Other Commonly Invoked Principles.
The toolbox has many special-purpose
tools, in the form of ethical principles
that capture ethical intuitions in very
specific contexts. Among these are the
wisdom of repugnance, natural is good,
and the therapy-enhancement distinction,
which will be explained as they become
relevant later.
The Consequentialism
Compartment: Parsing
Consequences for Ethical Decision
Making
The basic tools of consequentialism are
fewer and simpler than deontology (see
Holland, 2003; Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, 2014 to learn more about
philosophical ethics and Farah, 2010 for
an overview of the ethics of neurosci-
ence). Here I will present a few concepts
that are helpful in applying consequential-
ism to neurotechnology.Kinds of Consequences. In Bentham’s
original hedonistic consequentialism,
ethical actions are those that maximize
everyone’s pleasure. Because this seems
to make the nucleus accumbens the
arbiter of too much, a common variant is
preference or desire consequentialism,
where we act to maximize fulfillment
of our more considered preferences. Of
course our preferences themselves might
be mistaken, so other approaches have
been considered, including perfectionist
consequentialism, which tells us to maxi-
mize the perfection or full flourishing of
human potential.
Interests. These can be viewed as the
consequentialist counterpart to rights,
missing the obligatory nature of rights.
They can be weighed relative to one
another.
Externalities. Economists coined this
term, referring to the effects of actions
by one party on others who are not
directly involved. This broadens the range
of possible consequences that must be
considered.
Sentience. To have interests, and thus
figure in the consequentialist calculus,
an entity must be sentient, that is, capable
of experiencing perceptual and affective
states. Humans are highly sentient, but
at least some and perhaps all animals
would also appear to be sentient.
Applying the Tools to
Neurotechnology
Research Ethics
Human Subjects. A mix of consequential-
ist and deontological considerations
guide our treatment of human subjects,
including risk-benefit ratio and informed
consent, the latter respecting subject
autonomy. In research with neurological
or neuropsychiatric patients, subjects
may lack the competence needed for
informed consent, and regulations then
focus on protecting the person from
harm, with nonmalfesience a particularly
important principle.
Animal Subjects. The ethics of animal
research is generally understood in con-
sequentialist terms. Animals are viewed
as sentient and we therefore strive to
protect their interests asmuch as possible
while accomplishing worthy research.
The 3Rs of humane animal research
(Russell and Burch, 1959) are a conse-
quentialist amelioration of the ethicalNeurdownside of animal research, based on
a quantitative approach to degrees of
goodness and badness. Animal research
in neuroscience may be more ethically
freighted than other fields, at least for
modeling disorders of emotion and pain.
Also relevant to the consequentialist
calculation on the benefits side, the
validity and usefulness of some animal
models have been questioned (Nestler
and Hyman, 2010). The idea of person-
hood and rights for some animals is an
idea with some adherents (e.g., Regan,
1983).
Fetal and Embryonic Stem Cells. Those
in favor of human fetal and embryonic
stem cell research typically offer conse-
quentialist arguments about the promise
of these methods for curing disease.
A deontological ethical analysis will
depend mainly on whether fetuses
and embryos are considered persons. If
they are persons, then they have a right
to life. Even if their fate would otherwise
be the medical waste container, one
would be commodifying them, or the
reproductive functions of the parents, by
using them. Although this is not my per-
sonal view, I think it is worth seeing that
these objections arise from an approach
to ethics that most of us have some
sympathy for, even if we ultimately come
down on the side of pursuing helpful
new therapies.
Humanized Animals. Human genes
and cells can be introduced into animal
brains to create human disease models.
Psychological changes can likely be
induced by humanization; after all, be-
haviors can be transferred across non-
human species (Balaban, 2005). Given
how little we know about the likely
psychology of nonhuman animals that
have been humanized, it may be chal-
lenging to assess their levels of comfort,
suffering, or frustration. This makes con-
sequentialist analyses difficult to carry
out. The primary deontological issue is
which side of the person/nonperson line
humanized animals are on. Sufficiently
humanized primates might acquire
mental capacities associated with highly
developed sentience or even personhood
(Greene et al., 2005). Repugnance is one
motivator of ethical discussion of human-
ized animals, spurring us to question or,
some might wish, limit the use of these
methods.on 86, April 8, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 35
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been cultured in substrates that allow
them to grow and connect in three dimen-
sions, enabling the clumps of tissue to
self-organize in surprisingly complex
ways (Lancaster et al., 2013). How these
organoids develop and what functions
they might eventually display have yet to
be fully grasped. They are mentioned
here as a reminder of the rapidly changing
nature of neuroscience research, and
the possibility that radically new ethical
challenges could arise in the future. We
can be confident that current cerebral
organoids are tissue rather than brains,
let alone animals, humans, or persons.
One would not attribute interests, let
alone rights, to them. But if they become
larger and more organized, is there a
point at which that might change?
Repugnance, whether ‘‘wise’’ or not,
may give us pause about the develop-
ment of such entities and invites further
analysis.
Clinical Applications of
Neurotechnology
Tissue grafting, brain computer interfaces
with external or implanted components,
deep brain stimulation, and noninvasive
brain stimulation are all in clinical use or
clinical trials. Some of the ethical issues
they raise are familiar from other biomed-
ical technologies, but others relate more
specifically to the novel ways in which
the technologies affect the brain and call
for new ethical analyses.
One such issue concerns privacy. The
bioethics of privacy has traditionally
concerned medical records. A novel
issue that arises with brain-computer
interfaces is the possibility of unautho-
rized access to patients’ mental pro-
cesses, inferred from their neural activity.
This concern does not assume a quantum
jump in brain decoding ability. Even exist-
ing technologies can derive psychological
information from continuously recorded
brain activity when correlated to situa-
tional factors. For example, brain activity
while watching the evening news could
be analyzed for a patient’s responses
to content associated with different
political ideologies, personality traits,
and all manner of other traits and states.
Our communications, shopping habits,
and other behaviors have already become
more visible to others; our minds may
also become more transparent in an era36 Neuron 86, April 8, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inof devices that continuously read out
brain activity.
The autonomy of personsmay also face
new challenges from neurotechnology.
DARPA’s RAM and SUBNETS programs
(Ling, 2013) indicate that the prospect
of control over cognitive and emotional
processes is not mere science fiction.
Whether by hackers or Big Brother, deliv-
ery of stimulation to the brain has the
potential to manipulate thought, feeling,
and behavior.
The ethical analysis of clinical neuro-
technology has similar outcomes whether
approached with the tools of deontology,
as above, or consequentialism. Focusing
on consequences, it is clear that hijack-
ing BCI and DBS systems could have
extremely harmful consequences.
Neurotechnology beyond the Lab
and Clinic
Other applications of neurotechnology
are nonmedical, aimed at enhancing
quality of life or achievement in healthy
individuals. As neurotechnologies are
adopted more widely for therapeutic
use, nontherapeutic uses will probably
follow, just as they have for other medical
therapies from plastic surgery to psycho-
pharmacology. Indeed, noninvasive brain
stimulation is already used by some with
the goal of enhancing mood, concentra-
tion, and gaming skills (Miller, 2014).
It is worth noting that some of the
neurotechnologies discussed here may
prove more effective than the pharmaco-
logic methods of cognitive enhancement
currently in use, for example, the use of
prescription stimulants by college stu-
dents to increase attention (Smith and
Farah, 2011). Compared to the broad
modulatory effects of most neuropsychi-
atric drugs, precisely targeted stimulation
or augmentation by sensory, motor, and
computational devices have the potential
tomore radically enhance human capabil-
ities. It will be years, if not decades, before
we know the impact of these technologies
on healthy individuals and on society,
but beginning an ethical analysis now
will help us guide their development.
Enhancement has been regarded as
ethically dubious by those who believe
that natural is good. One problem with
this principle is that many natural things
are plainly bad—for example, diseases—
and we have no objections to intervening
technologically in such cases. If we try toc.place reasonable limits on this principle,
accepting the natural as an ideal to be
surrendered only in case of medical
need, we invoke another principle, namely
that illness and health are distinct states
and thus therapy and enhancement are
also distinct. Conflicting with this are the
many medical conditions that occur on
a continuum with good health, such as
hypertension and type 2 diabetes. If there
is no objective therapy-enhancement
distinction, then we cannot use it to deter-
mine which uses of neurotechnology are
therapeutically justified andwhich are not.
There are more fundamental ways in
which neurotechnological enhancement
grates against a deontological under-
standing of ethics. When we improve
our psychological function by brain
intervention, it is much like improving our
car’s performance by making adjust-
ments under the hood. In both cases,
the goal is to improve function, and to
the extent that we succeed without
introducing problematic side effects, we
may view the consequences as good.
But in so doing, we are treating a per-
son—our self in the case of voluntary
brain enhancement—as an object. Rather
than improving our abilities through the
exercise of our own agency, by effortful
practice and the like, we are short-circuit-
ing that agency and hence, the argument
goes, diminishing our personhood. In
the words of the President’s Council on
Bioethics (2003) under George W. Bush,
‘‘Personal achievements impersonally
achieved are not truly the achievements
of persons . [the problem] lies not in
the fact that the assisting drugs and
devices are artifacts, but in the danger
of violating or deforming the nature of
human agency and the dignity of the
naturally human way of activity.’’ A related
point is that a focus on improved mental
function commodifies human abilities.
A concern with justice calls atten-
tion to the likelihood that the benefits
of brain enhancement will be enjoyed
by the already privileged, a failure of
distributive justice. But managed appro-
priately, enhancement could lessen the
inequalities of genes and upbringing that
gave some of us sharper eyes, higher
IQs, and happier temperaments than
others (Dunlop and Savulescu, 2014).
From a consequentialist viewpoint,
the ethics of enhancement might seem
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were not good for you it would not be
an enhancement’’ (Harris, 2007). Julian
Savelescu unpacks this a bit further and
reminds us that some enhancements
might be better than others: ‘‘Enhance-
ment can be defined as something which
makes our lives better . What makes
a good life is subject to discussion;
hedonists believe it is the pursuit of
pleasure, others believe that it is found
in desire fulfillment and others in the
perfection of well-being . Enhancement
can help achieve the good life by
providing . qualities that increase the
chances of us having a good life, such
as health or intelligence’’ (Savelescu,
2009).
The consequentialist calculus includes
negative as well as positive conse-
quences. In addition to the possible
health risks of brain enhancement there
could be neural tradeoffs whereby the
enhancement of one ability comes at the
cost of another (e.g., Iuculano and Cohen
Kadosh, 2013). There may also be
externalities of the choice to enhance.
Widespread enhancement at school or
work will redefine ‘‘normal.’’ Unenhanced
workers who were once among the best
performing will slip in their relative stand-
ing and what the boss expects from
employees will be ratcheted up by each
new enhancement that comes along.
This creates pressure to enhance, which
seems a clear negative consequence.
Thus, consequentialism does not give
generic support to the morality of en-
hancement; it will do its work case by
case on the basis of the consequences.
Carried to extremes, the brain en-
hancements of the distant future may
result in beings so different from us that
one would call them ‘‘transhuman.’’
There is no guarantee that continued
enhancement will lead us all the way
to transhumanism, but likewise there is
no reason to assume it will not. Philoso-
pher Nick Bostrom offers a primarily
consequentialist argument for embracing
transhumanism, emphasizing ‘‘the enor-
mous potential for genuine improve-ments in human well-being and human
flourishing that are attainable only via
technological transformation’’ (Bostrom,
2005). Others see negative conse-
quences, including the possibility that
humans like us may not fare well in a
world with transhumans; we may be
viewed as inferior life forms, much as
we now regard chimpanzees, and
treated accordingly (Warwick, 2003).
This was echoed, in consequentialist
and deontological terms, by political sci-
entist Francis Fukuyama in nominating
transhumanism as ‘‘the world’s most
dangerous idea’’: ‘‘If we start transform-
ing ourselves into something superior,
what rights will these enhanced crea-
tures claim, and what rights will they
possess when compared to those left
behind?’’ (Fukuyama, 2004).Conclusion
Brain-computer interfaces and dignity
may seem like the proverbial fish and
bicycle—the latter has nothing to offer
the former. But consider the new ethical
dilemmas that will accompany neuro-
technological developments, and the
need for scientists, clinicians and the
rest of society to respond. The concepts
of philosophical ethics are tools for
bringing these issues into sharper
focus, analyzing them according to more
general and familiar considerations
and communicating about them across
differences of ethical intuition.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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